Freedom as a source of constraint : expanding market discipline through free movement by SAYDÉ, Alexandre
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
LAW 2015/42 
Department of Law 
Freedom as a source of constraint:  
Expanding market discipline through free movement 
Alexandre Saydé 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
European University Institute 
Department of Law 
 
 
 
FREEDOM AS A SOURCE OF CONSTRAINT:   
EXPANDING MARKET DISCIPLINE THROUGH FREE MOVEMENT 
Alexandre Saydé 
 
EUI Working Paper LAW 2015/42 
 
  
 
 
This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for 
other purposes, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the author. If cited or 
quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author, the title, the working paper or other 
series, the year, and the publisher. 
 
ISSN 1725-6739 
 
© Alexandre Saydé, 2015 
Printed in Italy 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I-50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.eu 
  
Author’s contact details 
Alexandre Saydé  
alexandre.sayde@eui.eu 
 
Abstract 
Free movement increases the degree of market discipline within every Member State by exposing 
domestic workers and businesses to competitive pressures coming from other Member States. 
However, the nature of this amplifying effect on market discipline is fundamentally different 
depending on whether free movement is interpreted as requiring national treatment (chiefly in relation 
to workers, with the notable exception of posted workers) or mutual recognition (chiefly in the areas 
of goods, services and companies). 
National treatment tends to subject domestic and incoming workers to the same regulatory standard, 
which is defined by the host State (level-playing field). As a result, domestic and incoming workers 
are engaged in a process of merit-based competition, in which superior merits tend to translate into 
higher market shares. To that extent, national treatment generates extra competitive pressures on 
domestic workers, who can be displaced by incoming workers showing superior merits. However, 
these extra competitive pressures are likely to be limited and not be felt as ‘unfair’, since they arise on 
a level-playing field. 
By contrast, mutual recognition subjects domestic and foreign producers to different regulatory 
standards: domestic goods, services and companies must abide by the law of the host State, whereas 
incoming goods, services and companies remain subject to the law of their home State. As a result, 
competition between domestic and imported producers is based not only on merit, but also on the cost 
of compliance with national laws. Producers established in a low(er)-regulation home State enjoy a 
structural competitive advantage – originating in regulation – over domestic producers established in 
the host State, irrespective of their eventual superior merits. Consequently, the competitive pressures 
added by mutual recognition may be substantial and felt as ‘unfair’; arguably, the so-called ‘Polish 
plumber’ is a mutual-recognition plumber, not a national-treatment plumber. 
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 1 
Introduction 
This working paper
1
 describes the amplifying effect of free movement upon market discipline. Market 
discipline can be defined as the constraining force collectively exerted by competitors present on a 
market. As the number of potential outlets is limited, economic agents offering goods and services are 
exposed to the risk of being displaced by competitors. In order to mitigate this risk and preserve or 
increase their market shares, they are forced to adapt their behaviour: this constraining force is 
hereinafter designated as market discipline. 
Academic research in the area of free movement law is often limited to a description of the legal 
obligations falling upon Member States, chiefly national treatment and mutual recognition. The 
present paper deals with another – less immediate but no less important – constraint originating in free 
movement, namely market discipline. Free movement increases the degree of market discipline within 
every Member State, by exposing domestic workers and businesses to competitive pressures coming 
from other Member States. In order to enquire this amplifying effect of free movement upon market 
discipline, it is useful to establish, in a first step, a typology of the policies available to Member States 
when regulating cross-border activities (first part). This typology will permit a structured approach to 
the effects of free movement on market discipline, and in particular of the fundamentally different 
impacts of national treatment and mutual recognition (second part). 
Typology of policies available to member states when regulating cross-border activities 
Member States may adopt one of three distinct policies when regulating cross-border activities: they 
can treat cross-border activities worse, equally or better than domestic ones. These three policies are 
usually captured by the concepts of discrimination, national treatment and mutual recognition. 
Discrimination is the policy traditionally applied in trade relationships among States: it takes the form 
chiefly of customs duties and quotas or, in the most extreme cases, of economic embargos. Since the 
founding of the European Economic Community on 1 January 1958 by the Treaty of Rome (signed in 
1957), discriminations on grounds of nationality or origin are as a rule incompatible with the freedoms 
of movement.
2
 There are numerous examples of discriminatory measures struck down by the Court 
interpreting the Treaty provisions on free movement, including direct discriminations (such as 
nationality requirements)
3
 and indirect ones (such as residence requirements).
4
 Exceptionally, 
discriminatory measures may be upheld under free movement law: in such cases, the freedoms of 
                                                     
1
 The author is référendaire at the Court of Justice of the European Union (LL.M. Harvard; Ph.D. EUI). Obviously, this 
working paper only reflects the views of the author, not that of the Court. This working paper has benefited from 
insightful comments and criticisms kindly offered by, in the alphabetical order, Bruno de Witte, Thierry Erniquin, 
Susanna Greijer, Ulrich Klinke and Charles-Henry Massa. The final version of this working paper will be published in P 
Koutrakos, J Snell (eds), Research Handbook on the Law of the EU’s Internal Market (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2015, 
forthcoming). 
2
 According to settled case law, the freedoms of movement include an ‘in-built’ rule of non-discrimination: see eg Generali-
Providencia Biztosító, Case C-470/13, EU:C:2014:2469, paras 30–31; Josemans, Case C-137/09, EU:C:2010:774, paras 
51–52. Article 18 TFEU applies independently only to situations for which the Treaty lays down no specific rules of non-
discrimination. For a recent instance in which the Court applied 18 TFEU independently, since the freedoms of 
movement were not applicable, see International Jet Management, Case C-628/11, EU:C:2014:171. The Court ruled that 
Article 18 TFEU precluded a German legislation obliging non-German airlines to obtain permission to make inward 
flights in respect of charter flights, which required evidence that German airlines were not in a position to carry out the 
flights (a ‘non-availability declaration’). 
3
 See n 14 below. 
4
 See n 15 below. 
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movement impose no particular legal obligation on Member States, which are granted a ‘licence to 
discriminate’.5 The Treaty FEU itself provides for several derogations to the freedoms of movement;6 
for instance, Article 51 TFEU grants Member States a licence to discriminate in relation to activities 
that are connected ‘with the exercise of official authority’.7 However, the Court has notoriously 
adopted a restrictive stance towards derogations to free movement.
8
  
Overall, and without denying the existence of certain derogations granting a licence to discriminate to 
Member States, the upholding of discriminations on grounds of nationality remains exceptional under 
free movement law. Of much greater relevance are the obligations of national treatment and mutual 
recognition. 
National treatment: treating cross-border and domestic activities equally 
The second policy available to Member States, namely national treatment, consists in treating 
domestic and cross-border activities equally. The general idea conveyed by the expression ‘national 
treatment’ is that Member States must ‘treat’ nationals of other Member States as their own 
‘nationals’. It is important to underline that an obligation of national treatment does not compel 
Member States to treat cross-border activities better than domestic ones, by contrast with an obligation 
of mutual recognition (see next section). 
Under free movement law, obligations of national treatment are mostly imposed in relation to citizens 
and workers (with the notable exception of posted workers
9
). The regulation of migrant workers aptly 
illustrates the concrete functioning of the obligation of national treatment. Article 45(2) TFEU 
provides that the freedom of movement for workers shall entail the abolition of any discrimination 
based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and 
other conditions of work and employment. National treatment means that, as a rule, the State of 
employment (‘host State’) is bound to apply the laws governing the activities of its own nationals 
(‘host law’) to incoming workers. This obligation of national treatment for migrant workers has been 
implemented by Regulation 492/2011 in relation to conditions of employment and work
10
 and by 
                                                     
5
 See for instance Dano, Case C-333/13, EU:C:2014:2358 (refusal to grant certain special non-contributory cash benefits in 
Germany to nationals of other Member States who are not economically active, whereas those benefits are granted to 
German nationals in the same situation); Josemans, Case C-137/09, EU:C:2010:774 (municipal rules adopted in 
Maastricht in order to restrict the admission to coffee-shops to Netherlands residents); Geven, Case C-213/05, 
EU:C:2007:438 (requirement of residence and/or substantial employment in Germany to receive child-raising 
allowance); Baldinger, Case C-386/02, EU:C:2004:535 (Austrian nationality requirement to receive a compensation a 
monthly allowance for former prisoners of war). 
6
 See especially Articles 36 TFEU (goods); 45(4) TFEU (workers); 51, 52(1) and 62 TFEU (establishment and services); 
65(1)(a) TFEU (capitals) 
7
 See Case C-438/08 Commission/Portugal, EU:C:2009:651, para 36 and case law cited. 
8
 See C Barnard, ‘Derogations, Justifications and the Four Freedoms: Is State Interest Really Protected?’ in C Barnard and O 
Odudu (eds), The Outer Limits of European Union Law (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2009), 273–305. According to the 
Court’s settled case law, the freedoms of movement must be interpreted broadly, and correlatively any derogation must 
be interpreted strictly: see inter alia Commission/Germany, Case C-319/05, EU:C:2007:678, para 88 (goods); Omega, 
Case C-36/02, EU:C:2004:614, para 30 (services); Ziebell, Case C-371/08, EU:C:2011:809, para 81 (workers); Bozkurt, 
Case C-303/08, EU:C:2010:800, para 56 (persons); Verest and Gerards, Case C-489/13, EU:C:2014:2210, para 26 
(capital); Commission v France, Case C-50/08, EU:C:2011:335, para 74 (establishment); Insinööritoimisto InsTiimi Oy, 
Case C-615/10, EU:C:2012:324, para 35 (freedoms of movement in general). 
9
 See n 63 to n 73 below and accompanying text. 
10
 Regulation (EU) 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for 
workers within the Union [2011] OJ L 141/1. See in particular Article 1(1) on equal treatment in relation to the right to 
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Regulation 883/2004 in the field of social security.
11
 Both regulations have been the object of ample 
case law.
12
 
The overall effect of these provisions is to trigger a change of law whenever a worker takes up an 
employment in another Member State: the regulatory powers of the former country of employment 
(home country) are pre-empted to the benefit of the new country of employment (host country). As 
nicely coined by AG Fennelly, ‘the migrant worker must take the national employment market as he 
finds it’.13 
However, national treatment does not always amount to the mere extension of host law to incoming 
workers: national treatment may require the host State to adapt host law and be ‘other-regarding’, by 
taking into account facts or events occurring in the home State. Indeed, the mere application of host 
law (namely the laws governing the activities of nationals) will prevent direct discriminations, by 
precluding the host State from treating non-nationals differently from its own nationals.
14
 But applying 
host law to non-nationals could still lead to indirect discriminations, especially when it relies on facts 
and events occurring on the territory of the host State. Residence requirements represent one classical 
example of such indirect discriminations:
15
 even where they apply to both nationals and non-nationals, 
residence requirements are ‘liable to operate mainly to the detriment of nationals of others Member 
States, as non-residents are in the majority of cases foreign nationals’.16 Therefore, unless justified, 
residence requirements are incompatible with an obligation of national treatment.
17
 
(Contd.)                                                                  
take up and pursue an activity as an employed person in another Member State; Article 7(1) on equal treatment with 
regard to conditions of employment and work; Article 7(2) on equal treatment with regard to social and tax advantages. 
11
 Regulation (EU) 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social 
security systems [2004] OJ L 166/1. See in particular Article 4 on equal treatment with regard to benefits and obligations; 
Articles 11(1) and 11(3)(a) according to which employed or self-employed persons shall be only subject to the legislation 
of the Member State of employment. 
12
 On the interpretation of Article 1(1) of Regulation 1612/68, predecessor of Article 1(1) of Regulation 492/2011, see eg 
Commission v Greece, Case C-290/94, EU:C:1996:265; Commission v Belgium, Case C-37/93, EU:C:1993:911. On the 
interpretation of Article 7(1) of Regulation 492/2011, see Zentralbetriebsrat der gemeinnützigen Salzburger 
Landeskliniken, Case C-514/12, EU:C:2013:799. On the interpretation of its predecessor, Article 7(1) of Regulation 
1612/68, see eg Commission v Italy, Case C-371/04, EU:C:2006:668; Köbler, Case C-224/01, EU:C:2003:513. On the 
interpretation of Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68, predecessor of Article 7(2) of Regulation 492/2011, see eg Giersch, 
Case C-20/12, EU:C:2013:411; Commission/Netherlands, Case C-542/09, EU:C:2012:346; Hartmann, Case C-212/05, 
EU:C:2007:437; Commission v Luxembourg, Case C-299/01, EU:C:2002:394; Zurstrassen, Case C-87/99, 
EU:C:2000:251. On the interpretation of Article 3(1) of Regulation 1408/71, predecessor of Article 4 of Regulation 
883/2004, see eg Landtová, Case C-399/09, EU:C:2011:415; Chateignier, Case C-346/05, EU:C:2006:711; Laurin 
Effing, Case C-302/02, EU:C:2005:36; Offermanns, Case C-85/99, EU:C:2001:166. 
13
 AG Fennelly, Graf, Case C-190/98, EU:C:1999:423, para 32. 
14
 A different treatment may take the form of an additional obligation (eg higher tax rate, extra requirement to exercise a 
profession) or a denied benefit (eg tax benefit, social benefit). Nationality requirements represent a common form of 
direct discrimination: see eg Reyners, Case 2/74, EU:C:1974:68 (nationality requirement to exercise the profession of 
lawyer in Belgium); Commission v Belgium (Notaries), Case C-47/08, EU:C:2011:334 (nationality requirement to 
exercise the profession of notary in Belgium); Landtová, Case C-399/09, EU:C:2011:415, paras 41–43 (nationality 
requirement to receive a supplement to old age benefit in Czech Republic); Haralambidis, Case C-270/13, 
EU:C:2014:2185 (nationality requirement to become president of a port authority in Italy). 
15
 See eg Landtová, Case C-399/09, EU:C:2011:415, paras 44–46 (residence requirement to receive a supplement to old age 
benefit in Czech Republic); Commission/Netherlands, Case C-542/09, EU:C:2012:346, paras 52–55 (residence 
requirement to receive portable studies funding); Giersch, Case C-20/12, EU:C:2013:411, paras 41–46 (residence 
requirement in Luxembourg to receive studies funding). 
16
 See inter alia Giersch, Case C-20/12, EU:C:2013:411, paras 42–45. 
17
 Analytically, accepting the equivalence of a residence in another State is tantamount to removing the requirement of a 
residence in the host State altogether. 
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Several cases decided by the Court in the field of social security further illustrate this obligation to 
accept the equivalence of facts and events occurring on the territory of another State. Reichel-Albert 
concerned a German legislation which provided that, for the purposes of the granting of an old-age 
pension, child-raising periods completed in another Member State were, as a rule, not taken into 
account, unlike those completed in the national territory (para 37).
18
 The Court ruled that such 
legislation was contrary to the principle of equal treatment (paras 41–42) and that Article 21 TFEU 
required Germany to take account of child-raising periods completed in another Member State as 
though those periods had been completed on its national territory (para 45). This judgment did not 
preclude Germany, as host country, from applying the standard of its choosing (national treatment); 
but it did oblige Germany to adapt its laws in order to take into account an event that occurred in 
Belgium ‘as though this event occurred on its national territory’ (obligation to be other-regarding).19 
This obligation has been codified in Article 5 of Regulation 883/2004 on the coordination of social 
security systems, headed ‘equal treatment of benefits, income, facts or events’, which provides that the 
competent State must treat, as though they had taken place on its own territory, the receipt of social 
security benefits or other income and the occurrence of facts or events in another Member State. 
In the field of diplomas, the Vlassopoulou judgment provides another illustration of national treatment 
qualified by an obligation to be other-regarding.
20
 Mrs Vlassopoulou applied to the German authorities 
for admission as a Rechtsanwältin. Her application was rejected because she did not meet the formal 
requirements imposed under German law, although she held a law degree from a Greek university, a 
doctorate in law from a German university and a working experience with a German law firm. The 
Court ruled that, in the absence of harmonization of the conditions of access to a particular occupation, 
Member States were entitled to lay down the knowledge and qualifications needed in order to pursue it 
(paras 9–12: national treatment).21 Nevertheless, the host State had to take into consideration the 
diplomas, certificates and other evidence of qualifications acquired in other Member States (paras 15–
23: obligation to be other-regarding).
22
 The Court applied a similar reasoning in the Gebhard case.
23
 
Italy was entitled to lay down conditions, and enforce them upon non-nationals, for the taking-up and 
pursuit of certain self-employed activities such as the profession of lawyer, and for the use of 
professional titles such as ‘avvocato’ (paras 35–36: national treatment). Nevertheless, Italian 
authorities had to take into consideration the knowledge and qualifications already acquired in another 
Member State (paras 37–38: obligation to be other-regarding). 
To sum up, an obligation of national treatment compels the host State to treat non-nationals as its own 
nationals. As a rule, the host State is bound to extend the laws governing the activities of its nationals 
to workers coming from other States. Nevertheless, an obligation of national treatment may also 
require the host State to adapt host law by treating facts or events that occurred in another State as 
though they had occurred on its own territory. 
                                                     
18
 Reichel-Albert, Case C-522/10, EU:C:2012:475. 
19
 Similar decisions in the field of social security, in which the Court obliged the host State to accept the equivalence of facts 
and events that occurred in the home State, include Dumont de Chassart, Case C-619/11, EU:C:2013:92; Klöppel, Case 
C-507/06, EU:C:2008:110; Öztürk, Case C-373/02, EU:C:2004:232. 
20
 Vlassopoulou, Case C-340/89, EU:C:1991:193. 
21
 See also Bouchoucha, Case C-61/89, EU:C:1990:343, para 16, in which the Court allowed a Member State (France) to 
preclude one of its nationals, who held a diploma in osteopathy from another Member State (UK), from pursuing this 
activity on its territory where it was restricted to persons holding the qualification of doctor of medicine. 
22
 For a recent application of this comparison exercise, see Peñarroja Fa, Joined Cases C-372/09 and C-373/09, 
EU:C:2011:156, paras 76–78. 
23
 Gebhard, Case C-55/94, EU:C:1995:411. 
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Mutual recognition: treating cross-border activities better than domestic ones 
Whereas the obligation of national treatment compels the host State to treat nationals of other Member 
States as its own nationals, the obligation of mutual recognition goes beyond that by requesting the 
host State to treat nationals of other Member States better than its own nationals. In most instances, 
‘better treatment’ means that some obligations imposed by the host State to domestic producers are not 
applicable to incoming goods, services or companies. 
The best way to highlight the differences between national treatment and mutual recognition is to start 
with the seminal Cassis de Dijon judgment (1979), in which the Court established for the first time 
that free movement of goods could demand more than national treatment.
24
 As is well known, this 
case concerned the import of a French fruit liqueur named ‘Cassis de Dijon’ into Germany. The 
German monopoly administration for spirits rejected the application for import, on the ground that 
‘Cassis de Dijon’, whose alcohol content was between 15 and 20%, did not meet the minimum alcohol 
content of 25% required for the marketing of fruit liqueurs in Germany (paras 2–3). The Court first 
examined the possibility of this decision being ‘necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements’ 
(para 8): 
Obstacles to movement … resulting from disparities between the national laws relating to the marketing 
of the products in question must be accepted in so far as those provisions may be recognized as being 
necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal 
supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of 
the consumer. 
After reviewing the grounds of justification put forward by the German government (paras 9–13), the 
Court judged that the minimum alcohol requirement ‘did not serve a purpose which is in the general 
interest and such as to take precedence over the requirements of the free movement of goods’ (para 
14). The Court concluded its reasoning by formulating the new principle on which it founded its 
ruling, namely mutual recognition (para 14): 
There is therefore no valid reason why, provided that they have been lawfully produced and marketed in 
one of the Member States, alcoholic beverages should not be introduced into any other Member State; 
the sale of such products may not be subject to a legal prohibition on the marketing of beverages with 
alcohol content lower than the limit set by the national rules. 
If the Court had interpreted the free movement of goods as imposing a mere obligation of national 
treatment, as pleaded by the German government, it is undisputable that Germany would have won the 
Cassis de Dijon case: indeed, this minimum alcohol content requirement was not discriminatory, 
either directly or indirectly, against French liqueurs. German producers of fruit liqueurs with alcohol 
content lower than 25% were similarly barred from selling such products in Germany. Nevertheless, 
the Court ruled that Germany could not apply this requirement of minimum alcohol content to French 
imported liqueurs. Therefore, mutual recognition goes beyond national treatment by requesting the 
host State to treat goods from other Member States better than domestic goods. 
Following Cassis de Dijon, the Court almost systematically ruled that national treatment was not 
sufficient to ensure free movement of goods, thereby extending the scope of the obligation of mutual 
recognition. In all those cases, the host State did not claim a licence to discriminate against foreign 
products, but merely sought to apply non-discriminatory host laws to domestic and foreign products 
(national treatment).
25
 The Court established a derogation to the principle of mutual recognition in 
                                                     
24
 Rewe-Zentral (‘Cassis de Dijon’), Case 120/78, EU:C:1979:42. 
25
 See eg Rau Lebensmittelwerke, Case 261/81, EU:C:1982:382 (para 12); 3 Glocken et Kritzinger, Case 407/85, 
EU:C:1988:401 (para 10); Guimont, Case C-448/98, EU:C:2000:663 (paras 26–27); Mars, Case C-470/93, 
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Keck and Mithouard, which concerned a general prohibition on resale at a loss imposed under French 
law.
26
 The Court confirmed the obligation of mutual recognition for ‘product requirements’ imposed 
by the host State (para 15), but imposed a mere obligation of national treatment for ‘selling 
arrangements’ (para 16). However, the scope of the Keck derogation for selling arrangements 
remained rather limited.
27
 
The principle of mutual recognition has progressively pervaded other areas of free movement, chiefly 
the freedom to provide services. Arguably, the Court introduced the mutual recognition principle into 
the area of services in the Säger judgment, delivered in 1991. Säger concerned a German law making 
the provision of patent renewal services in Germany subject to the issue of an administrative licence 
for which the possession of certain professional qualifications, such as patent agent or lawyer, was 
required.
28
 Manfred Säger, a patent agent, sued Dennemeyer, a UK company, for providing patent 
renewal services in Germany without the required licence. As in Cassis de Dijon, if the Court had 
interpreted the freedom to provide services as imposing a mere obligation of national treatment, it is 
undisputable that Manfred Säger would have won this case: indeed, this licence requirement applied in 
the same way, both in law and in fact, to service providers from Germany and from other Member 
States. However, the Court stated that (para 12): 
[Article 56 TFEU] requires not only the elimination of all discrimination against a person providing 
services on the ground of his nationality but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies 
without distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member States, when it is 
liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a provider of services established in another 
Member State where he lawfully provides similar services. 
The application of this licence requirement to services providers from other Member States constituted 
a restriction on the freedom to provide services, even if it applied in the same way, both in law and in 
fact, to service providers from Germany (para 14). Therefore, the Court ruled that the freedom to 
provide services compelled the host State to treat services providers from other Member States better 
than domestic service providers, by not applying this licence requirement, in accordance with the 
principle of mutual recognition. Echoing the ‘mandatory requirements’ of Cassis de Dijon, the Court 
added that (para 15): 
[T]he freedom to provide services may be limited only by rules which are justified by imperative 
reasons relating to the public interest and which apply to all persons or undertakings pursuing an 
activity in the State of destination, in so far as that interest is not protected by the rules to which the 
person providing the services is subject in the Member State in which he is established. 
In the case at hand, however, the licence requirement could not be justified as it went beyond what 
was necessary to protect the recipients of patent renewal services (paras 17–18). In the wake of Säger, 
the Court increasingly considered non-discriminatory measures applied by the host State as restrictions 
(Contd.)                                                                  
EU:C:1995:224 (paras 11–15); Commission v Italy, Case C-14/00, EU:C:2003:22 (paras 69, 75, 78); Commission v 
Denmark, Case C-192/01, EU:C:2003:492 (paras 39–41). 
26
 Keck and Mithouard, Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, EU:C:1993:905. 
27
 The Court imposed mutual recognition in relation to non-discriminatory rules unrelated to product requirements: see eg 
Association des Centres distributeurs Leclerc and Thouars Distribution, Case 229/83, EU:C:1985:1, paras 23–26 and 
Fachverband der Buch- und Medienwirtschaft (‘LIBRO’), Case C-531/07, EU:C:2009:276, paras 17–22 (requirements of 
minimum retail price for books); Commission v Italy, C-110/05, EU:C:2009:66, paras 50 and 55–58 and Mickelsson and 
Roos, Case C-142/05, EU:C:2009:336, paras 25–28; Sandström, Case C-433/05, EU:C:2010:184, paras 31–40 
(restrictions on the use of motorcycle trailers and personal watercrafts). 
28
 Säger, Case C-76/90, EU:C:1991:331. 
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to the freedom to provide services.
29
 Mutual recognition is also the directing principle of the 
‘Bolkestein’ Directive 2006/123 on services in the internal market.30 This directive has vocation to 
apply to all services
31
 and imposes a stringent obligation of mutual recognition. The host State is only 
allowed to apply its national laws where they satisfy three cumulative conditions: the law is not 
discriminatory with regard to nationality; it is justified for reasons of public policy, public security, 
public health or the protection of the environment; it is suitable and does not go beyond what is 
necessary to attain that objective (article 16). 
In addition to goods and services, the Court also imposed an obligation of mutual recognition in 
relation to companies, in situations where a company formed in accordance with the law of one 
(home) State seeks to deploy its activities in another (host) State. In such ‘entry’ cases,32 a company 
disputes the application of host law, even where the obligations imposed under host law apply equally, 
both in law and in fact, to companies incorporated in the host State. The seminal Centros case 
concerned a private limited company incorporated in England and Wales, which sought to register a 
branch in Denmark.
33
 The Danish authorities refused to register the branch on the grounds that 
Centros, which did not trade in England and Wales, sought to circumvent the Danish rules on the 
paying-up of a minimum capital fixed at DKK 200.000 (para 7). As a matter of fact, the shareholders 
of Centros did not dispute the fact that they formed their company in the United Kingdom, where no 
requirement of a minimum share capital was imposed, for the purpose of avoiding the Danish rules on 
minimum paid-up capital (para 18). 
Had the Court imposed a mere obligation of national treatment on Danish authorities, Centros would 
have been obliged to abide by this non-discriminatory requirement of a minimum paid-up capital of 
DKK 200.000. The Court however ruled that Danish authorities could not refuse to register a branch 
of Centros in Denmark, even if that branch was intended to enable the company to carry on all its 
economic activity in Denmark, with the result that the secondary establishment escaped national rules 
on minimum capital (para 30). As in Cassis de Dijon and Säger, the Court obliged the host State to 
treat businesses from other States better than domestic ones. Centros – and the principle of mutual 
recognition for companies – was confirmed in Überseering and Inspire Art.34 
To sum up, the principle of mutual recognition requires the host State to treat cross-border activities 
better than domestic activities, by restraining itself from applying non-discriminatory measures to 
incoming goods, services or companies. 
                                                     
29
 See eg Gourmet International Products, Case C-405/98, EU:C:2001:135 (paras 35–40); De Coster, Case C-17/00, 
EU:C:2001:651 (paras 29–35); Cipolla, Joined Cases C-94/04 and C-202/04, EU:C:2006:758 (paras 56–60); Dirextra 
Alta Formazione, Case C-523/12, EU:C:2013:831 (paras 21-24); Citroën Belux, Case C-265/12, EU:C:2013:498 (paras 
35–36). 
30
 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on Services in the Internal 
Market [2006] OJ L 376/36. 
31
 See definition of the notion of ‘service’ at Article 4(1). Nevertheless, Articles 1(2) to 1(7), 2(2), 3(1), 3(2), 17 and 18 
establish a list of reservations, exclusions and derogations to the general applicability of Directive 2006/123. 
32
 In ‘exit’ cases, a company formed in one (home) State seeks to transfer its registered office, central administration or 
principal place of business to another (host) State, which may entail the loss of its legal personality under home law: on 
the distinction between entry and exit cases, see Überseering, Case C-208/00, EU:C:2002:632, paras 61–73; Inspire Art, 
Case C-167/01, EU:C:2003:512, paras 102–103. Seminal exit cases include Daily Mail and General Trust, Case 81/87, 
EU:C:1988:456; Cartesio, Case C-210/06, EU:C:2008:723. 
33
 Centros, Case C-212/97, EU:C:1999:126. 
34
 Überseering, Case C-208/00, EU:C:2002:632, paras 78–82; Inspire Art, Case C-167/01, EU:C:2003:512, paras 99–101. 
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Expanding market discipline through free movement 
The central submission of this paper is that free movement increases the degree of market discipline 
within every Member State, by exposing domestic workers and businesses to competitive pressures 
coming from other Member States. This amplifying effect of free movement on market discipline can 
be usefully decrypted in two steps: the switch from discrimination to national treatment and the switch 
from national treatment to mutual recognition. 
As the freedoms of movement are only concerned with cross-border activities, and not purely internal 
situations
35
, the obligations deriving from the freedoms of movement have no immediate effect on the 
degree of market discipline exercised by domestic competitors, namely competitors established within 
the host State. On the other hand, these obligations have very different effects on the market discipline 
exercised by competitors coming from other States, which are described in the next sections. 
From discrimination to national treatment: promoting a level-playing field between domestic and 
imported productions 
If the upholding of discriminations on grounds of nationality is exceptional under free movement law, 
what is the concrete impact of discriminatory policies on market discipline? Discriminatory policies 
impose extra burdens on workers and businesses coming from other States: they are either imposed an 
obligation not borne by domestic workers and businesses (direct extra burden) or denied a right 
enjoyed by the latter (indirect extra burden). In presence of such extra burdens, workers and 
businesses from other Member States are less or not able to compete on the basis of merit with 
domestic workers and businesses: schematically, their eventual superior merits are absorbed by the 
extra burdens imposed by the host State. As a result, discriminatory policies adopted by the host State 
tend to shield domestic workers and businesses from market discipline exerted by competitors from 
other States. This link between discriminatory policies and protectionism has long been established in 
the scholarship: 
Protectionism, essentially, is the protection of national production against competition from foreign 
trade. The non-discrimination principle in the field of trade was designed specifically to prohibit 
protectionism.
36
 
Similarly, the Court has long associated discriminatory internal taxation with protectionism: 
[T]he aim of Article 110 TFEU is to ensure free movement of goods between the Member States in 
normal conditions of competition. It is intended to eliminate all forms of protection which may result 
from the application of internal taxation that discriminates against products from other Member States.
37
 
Protected by discriminatory measures, workers and businesses in the host State tend to escape market 
discipline exerted by external competitors and be only subject to market discipline exercised by 
                                                     
35
 According to settled case-law, the Treaty provisions on free movement ‘ cannot be applied to activities which have no 
factor linking them with any of the situations governed by EU law and which are confined in all relevant respects within 
a single Member State’: see inter alia Airport Shuttle Express, Joined Cases C-162/12 and C-163/12, EU:C:2014:74, para 
43; Caixa d’Estalvis i Pensions de Barcelona, Case C-139/12, EU:C:2014:174, para 42; order in Szabó, Case C-204/14, 
EU:C:2014:2220, para 19. See also MP Maduro, ‘The Scope of European Remedies: the Case of Purely Internal 
Situations and Reverse Discrimination’ in C Kilpatrick, et al (eds), The Future of European Remedies (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2000); C Ritter, ‘Purely Internal Situations, Reverse Discrimination, Guimont, Dzodzi and article 234’ (2006) 
31 European Law Review 690. 
36
 G de Búrca, ‘Unpacking the Concept of Discrimination in EC and International Trade law’ in C Barnard and J Scott (eds), 
The Law of the Single Market: Unpacking the Premises (Hart: Oxford, 2002), 181–95, at 187. 
37
 Tatu, Case C-402/09, EU:C:2011:219, para 34. 
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domestic competitors within the host State – assuming that the host State allows competition in the 
economic sector concerned.
38
 In this process of merit-based competition, in which all domestic 
workers and businesses are subject to the same standards imposed by the host State, domestic 
competitors showing superior merits tend to progressively capture market shares. 
The switch from discrimination to national treatment has the effect of removing the protections 
afforded by discriminatory policies. As explained above, national treatment, which is commonly 
applied in relation to migrant workers (with the notable exception of posted workers
39
), obliges the 
host State to treat domestic workers and incoming workers equally. As a consequence, an obligation of 
national treatment has the effect, in most situations, of subjecting domestic and incoming workers to 
the same regulatory standard, which is defined by the host State. The existence of a unique regulatory 
standard is obvious when the host State is merely required to extend the laws governing the activities 
of its nationals to incoming workers, for instance in relation to taxation, labour law or social security.
40
 
But even when the host State is obliged to adapt its national laws in order to take into account facts 
and events occurring in the home State (obligation to be other-regarding, which is sometimes 
erroneously analysed as mutual recognition), both domestic and incoming workers must abide by the 
same standard defined by the host State. For instance, in Vlassopoulou, the Court made clear that the 
level of qualifications required by the host State applied to everyone, including migrant workers (paras 
9–12), even if the host State must take into account qualifications acquired in other States (paras 15–
23). 
The existence of a unique regulatory standard has one crucial effect in terms of market discipline: it 
allows migrant workers to offer their services in the host State under the same terms and conditions as 
national workers. Such a situation is often evoked as ‘competition on an equal footing’ or ‘level-
playing field’, namely a situation in which domestic and cross-border activities operate under equal 
competitive conditions: 
[T]he regulatory ideal of the common market consisted in the creation of a ‘level playing-field’ on 
which all economic actors could operate under equal competitive conditions, and across which goods, 
persons and services could be exchanged unhindered.
41
 
As they are subject to the same regulatory standard, domestic and migrant workers are engaged in a 
process of merit-based competition, in which superior merits tend to translate into higher market 
shares. Thus, migrant workers are able to gain market shares, at the expense of domestic workers, on 
the basis of their eventual superior merits. To that extent, domestic workers are exposed to extra 
competitive pressures imposed by migrant workers offering their services in the host State. 
However, as they are based on merit, these additional competitive pressures generated by national 
treatment can be absorbed by the host society through the ordinary functioning of domestic markets, 
for at least two reasons. Firstly, the competitive pressures added by national treatment are likely to be 
limited. It is indeed unlikely that a wave of super-skilled migrant workers will settle in the host State 
and overwhelm domestic workers on the basis of their superior merits: some migrant workers will be 
                                                     
38
 A State may indeed decide to exclude competition in a given economic sector, notably by entrusting a public or private 
monopoly with a specific economic activity such as the operation of games of chance, the sale of alcohol or tobacco, or 
the provision of health services. By way of illustration, on the exclusion of competition in the area of games of chance, 
see Sporting Exchange, Case C-203/08, EU:C:2010:307, para 58. 
39
 See n 63 to n 73 below and accompanying text. 
40
 For instance, by virtue of Article 7(1) of Regulation 492/2011, conditions of employment must be identical for national 
and migrant workers; by virtue of Article 7(2) of Regulation 492/2011, migrant workers enjoy the same social and tax 
advantages as national workers. 
41
 M Dougan, ‘Minimum Harmonization and the Internal Market’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 853–885, at 860. 
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more skilled, some will be less skilled, and most of them will have to overcome cultural and language 
barriers.
42
 
Second, there is a sense of fairness in the merit-based competition triggered by national treatment, 
which makes the competitive pressures added by incoming workers acceptable. Under national 
treatment, incoming workers are subject to the same regulatory standard as domestic workers; as a 
consequence, incoming workers can only gain market shares by showing equal or superior merits vis-
à-vis domestic workers. The fact that this competitive process is based on merit fulfils a legitimating 
function of the market discipline exerted by workers coming from other States: arguably, most 
European citizens accept that plumbers, accountants or bakers from other States find an employment 
in their country if they are subject to the same obligations and work better than domestic plumbers, 
accountants or bakers. Although a minority of European citizens would prefer discriminatory policies 
(national ‘preference’), the limited competitive pressures generated by national treatment were of the 
kind envisioned by every Member State upon joining the EU. Interestingly enough, the Spaak Report 
(1956), which prepared the adoption of the Rome Treaty a year later, expected national treatment to 
spontaneously lead the number of migrant workers – and the labour market – towards ‘equilibrium’: 
[I]f, on the one hand, discrimination is prohibited between national workers and migrant workers and if, 
on the other hand, a drop in salary is as a rule excluded either by State legislation of by action of trade 
unions, employers would have no incentive to have recourse to more migrant workers than they actually 
need to fill any vacancy. This way, pressure on remuneration levels is avoided and the labour market 
tends towards equilibrium.
43
 
To sum up, national treatment tends to subject domestic and migrant workers to the same regulatory 
standard (level-playing field); accordingly, it exposes domestic workers to merit-based competitive 
pressures exerted by workers coming from other Member States. 
From national treatment to mutual recognition: granting a structural competitive advantage to 
producers from low-regulation states 
As explained above, mutual recognition is the prevailing obligation in the area of goods (Cassis de 
Dijon), services (Säger) and companies (Centros). 
Whereas domestic and foreign producers are subject to the same regulatory standard under national 
treatment, they are subject to different regulatory standards under mutual recognition. By way of 
illustration, in Cassis de Dijon, Germany was deprived of the power to enforce a minimum alcohol 
requirement to imported French liqueurs, which remained subject to the sole French law: ‘Cassis 
introduces the principle of home state control and, in so doing, gives extraterritorial effect to the laws 
and standards laid down by the home state’.44 In practice, the host State loses the power to regulate 
imported products placed on its domestic market, and only retains the power to regulate domestic 
                                                     
42
 As explained in the next section, national treatment may even impose, in certain situations, a competitive disadvantage on 
incoming workers, which further limits the competitive pressures added by national treatment. 
43
 Comité Intergouvernemental créé par la Conférence de Messine, ‘Rapport des Chefs de Délégation aux Ministres des 
Affaires Étrangères’ (Rapport Spaak), 21 April 1956, available at aei.pitt.edu/996/01/Spaak_report_french.pdf, 89, free 
translation. 
44
 C Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: the Four Freedoms, 4th edn (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2013) 93-94; 
see also Saydé (n 45) 242 et seq; A Saydé, ‘One Law, Two Competitions: An Enquiry into the Contradictions of Free 
Movement Law’ (2010-2011) 13 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 365–413. 
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producers:
45
 following Cassis de Dijon, Germany merely retained the power to enforce its minimum 
alcohol requirement on German producers of liqueurs.
46
 
Given this coexistence of several regulatory standards, what is the effect of mutual recognition on 
market discipline? As they are subject to different regulatory standards, the competition between 
domestic and imported goods
47
 is based not only on merit, but also on the cost of compliance with 
national laws. Depending on whether compliance with home law (applicable to imported goods) is 
more, equally or less costly than compliance with host law (applicable to domestic goods), imported 
goods will suffer from a structural competitive disadvantage, be on a level-playing field or enjoy a 
competitive advantage vis-à-vis domestic goods. 
The revolution triggered by the Court in Cassis de Dijon, Säger and Centros lies precisely in the fact 
that, under an obligation of mutual recognition, producers established in a low(er)-regulation home 
State
48
 enjoy a structural competitive advantage over domestic producers established in the host State. 
Discrimination, which is traditionally applied in trade relationships outside the EU through customs 
duties and quotas, imposes a competitive disadvantage on foreign production. National treatment, 
which arguably was the policy elected by the Treaty of Rome (1957),
49
 aims at promoting a level-
playing field between domestic and foreign productions. It is only under mutual recognition that 
production coming from a low-regulation State is granted a structural competitive ‘bonus’, originating 
in regulation. 
The motives that spurred the Court to trigger this revolution in the area of goods (Cassis de Dijon) are 
well known. In essence, mutual recognition was intended to relieve imported goods from a specific 
competitive disadvantage which may flow from national treatment. Indeed, the switch from home law 
to host law may entail a specific cost for imported goods and services, which is not borne by domestic 
goods and services as they remain subject to the sole host law. AG Van Gerven observed: 
The main consideration underlying [Cassis de Dijon] is that such disparities between national laws may 
result in serious obstacles to intra-Community trade since they may necessitate extra expense or 
additional efforts in order to make the manufacture or the marketing of the product comply with laws 
differing from one Member State to another.
50
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 W Kerber and R Van den Bergh, ‘Mutual Recognition Revisited: Misunderstandings, Inconsistencies, and a Suggested 
Reinterpretation’ (2008) 61 Kyklos 447, 453–54; see also A Saydé, Abuse of EU Law and Regulation of the Internal 
Market (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2014), at 272. 
46
 The Court has regularly highlighted the impossibility for the host State to enforce its stricter standard in a context of 
mutual recognition: in relation to the mutual recognition of driving licences, see eg Akyüz, Case C-467/10, 
EU:C:2012:112, para 56; Hofmann, Case C-419/10, EU:C:2012:240, para 84. 
47
 This reasoning only refers to ‘goods’ in order to preserve readability, but applies equally to services and companies. 
48
 Namely a home State in which compliance with home law is less costly than compliance with host law. 
49
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for the Union legislature of adopting directives for the mutual recognition of diplomas. Furthermore, the actual wording 
of the Treaty provisions establishing the freedoms of movement is more reminiscent of an obligation of national 
treatment: Articles 28 and 30 TFEU prohibit customs duties and all charges having equivalent effect; Articles 34 and 35 
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 AG Van Gerven, Torfaen Borough Council v B & Q (Sunday Trading), Case 145/88, ECLI:EU:C:1989:279, para 15. 
Alexandre Saydé 
 
12 
This extra cost is easily identified when goods have to be modified or repackaged in order to be placed 
on the market of the host State, as in Cassis de Dijon. In such situations, the choice between national 
treatment and mutual recognition amounts to a choice between a competitive disadvantage for 
imported goods (national treatment) and a competitive advantage for goods imported from a low-
regulation country (mutual recognition). Yet in other situations, the switch from home law to host law 
does not entail a specific cost for imported goods and services, so that national treatment tends to 
create a level-playing field. For instance, the switch from home law to host law does not entail a 
specific cost for migrant workers: they become subject to tax, labour and social security obligations in 
the host State, whereas corresponding obligations in the home State cease to be applicable. Arguably, 
the same can be said of the selling arrangements addressed in Keck, the licencing requirement in Säger 
and the minimum capital requirement in Centros: in all those cases, the choice between national 
treatment and mutual recognition amounted to a choice between a level-playing field (national 
treatment) and a competitive advantage for goods, services or companies coming from a low-
regulation country (mutual recognition). 
Irrespective of the motives for imposing an obligation of mutual recognition, the crucial finding is that 
such an obligation grants a structural competitive advantage to producers established in a lower-
regulation home State, which deeply alters the nature of the market discipline imposed on domestic 
producers established in the host State. Indeed, such structural competitive advantages originating in 
regulation interfere with merit-based competition by ‘absorbing’, partly of wholly, the superior merits 
of domestic producers. In other words, and by contrast with national treatment, superior merits do not 
tend to translate into higher market shares under an obligation of mutual recognition.
51
 Domestic and 
imported producers are engaged in a second and parallel competition process, based on national laws, 
which is classically designated as ‘regulatory competition’: 
[T]he Cassis de Dijon principle, by requiring the receiving or ‘host state’ to open its markets to goods 
legitimately produced in any other Member State (the ‘home state’), provides a vital additional 
mechanism for subjecting laws to the forces of regulatory competition. This is the essence of ‘mutual 
recognition’. Consumers in the host state now have a choice of goods produced under different 
regulatory regimes. Competition between goods produced under different legal systems means, in 
effect, that the laws of those systems are thrown into competition with each other too.
52
 
Consequently, the market discipline entailed by mutual recognition is of a radically different nature 
than that generated by national treatment, owing to the risk that domestic producers suffer from a 
structural competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis producers coming from a low(er)-regulation State. First, 
there is no reason to think that the competitive pressures generated by mutual recognition should be 
limited. Since goods and services coming from low-regulation States enjoy a structural competitive 
edge over domestic goods and services, they could potentially displace a substantial share of national 
production. The potential scope of the competitive pressures entailed by mutual recognition can be 
illustrated with statistics regarding posted workers in the building sector in Belgium.
53
 According to 
Construction Confédération, an employer organization representing more than 15.000 businesses in 
the building sector in Belgium,
54
 17.000 jobs were lost during the period 2011-2014 (9,7% of the total 
number of jobs in the sector), despite a 2%-increase in activity. During the same period, the yearly 
number of ‘Limosa declarations’, which have to be filed by the employer before posting workers in 
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 In this sense, the effect of mutual recognition on market discipline mirrors the effect of discrimination: when 
discriminatory policies are allowed, producers from other States are not able to compete on the basis of merits; 
conversely, under an obligation of mutual recognition, domestic producers are not able to compete on the basis of merits 
with producers coming from a low-regulation State. 
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Belgium, more than doubled to reach the number of 314.924 in 2014. Construction Confédération 
deems that posted workers currently occupy 33.000 full-time equivalents in the building sector in 
Belgium, and that this phenomenon could destroy 20.000 more jobs by 2019. 
Secondly, law-based market discipline (mutual recognition) does not benefit from the legitimating 
function of merit-based market discipline (national treatment). Indeed, superior merits of domestic 
producers do not translate into higher market shares in the presence of a structural competitive 
advantage enjoyed by producers coming from low-regulation States. As a result, domestic workers and 
businesses feel a sense of unfairness when, irrespective of their merits, they cannot compete with 
businesses and workers coming from low-regulation States. By way of illustration, the competition 
waged by posted workers who remain subject to the less comprehensive social security of their home 
State is often labelled as ‘unfair’.55 The Court itself observed in the seminal Laval case that: 
[Article 3(1) of Directive 96/71] thus prevents a situation arising in which, by applying to their workers 
the terms and conditions of employment in force in the Member State of origin as regards [a limited list 
of] matters, undertakings established in other Member States would compete unfairly against 
undertakings of the host Member State in the framework of the transnational provision of services, if the 
level of social protection in the host Member State is higher.
56
 
It follows from what precedes that the competitive pressures entailed by mutual recognition and 
national treatment are of fundamentally different natures. As exposed in the previous section, the 
competitive pressures generated by national treatment are likely to be limited and are never labelled as 
‘unfair’, as they arise on a level-playing field. Conversely, the competitive pressures added under 
mutual recognition may be substantial and are felt as ‘unfair’ as they originate in the lower cost of 
compliance with the laws applicable in the home State. Arguably, the so-called ‘Polish plumber’ is a 
mutual-recognition plumber, not a national-treatment plumber. 
In practice, when producers tend to structurally lose their capacity to compete in their own domestic 
market with producers established in low-regulation States, they are left with three options: 
 cessation of activities: they can progressively abandon market shares to competitors from low-
regulation States; 
 deregulation: they can lobby for having the law in the host State amended in order to enable 
them to compete with businesses established in low-regulation States;57 or 
 relocation: they can avoid the law in the host State by making use of their right to establishment 
in a low-regulation State, in order to regain the capacity to compete. 
A cessation of activities is the least desirable option for businesses. Moreover, deregulation is hardly 
available in the short run, as national laws implement a longstanding social contract among various 
interest groups, chiefly between businesses and workers. As a consequence, relocation tends to 
become the main outlet for the competitive pressures created by mutual recognition for goods and 
services. In other words, mutual recognition for goods and services creates a pressure on producers in 
high-regulation States to relocate in low(er)-regulation States, in order to regain their capacity to 
compete. It is important to highlight that producers may decide to relocate in order to anticipate a risk 
of structural competitive disadvantage, namely before being actually exposed to it. 
This pressure to relocate can be illustrated with the seminal Viking case.
58
 Viking, a Finnish company, 
operated ferries plying the route between Helsinki and Tallinn, among which was the Rosella. The 
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 See eg X Attout, ‘La concurrence déloyale mine le secteur de la construction’, Le Soir, 24 February 2015; P Lorent, 
‘20.000 emplois menacés dans la construction’, Le Soir, 30 April 2015. 
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 Laval, Case C-341/05, EU:C:2007:809, para 75, emphasis added. 
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Rosella was under the Finnish flag, so that Viking was bound to pay Finnish crew wages. Other ferries 
plying the same route were under the Estonian flag, and therefore paid (lower) Estonian crew wages. 
Since activities on-board a ship are governed by the law of the flag State, Finland had no means to 
impose Finnish crew wages on Estonian ferries navigating to Helsinki, which amounted, in effect, to a 
situation of mutual recognition. In its judgment, the Court described the logical sequence leading from 
mutual recognition to relocation (para 9): 
The Rosella was running at a loss as a result of direct competition from Estonian vessels operating on 
the same route with lower wage costs. As an alternative to selling the vessel, Viking sought … to reflag 
it by registering it in either Estonia or Norway, in order to … enter into a new collective agreement with 
a trade union established in one of those States. 
To paraphrase the Court, the Rosella suffered from a structural competitive disadvantage in the 
competition process with Estonian vessels operating on the same route with lower wage costs. Since a 
reduction of Finnish crew wages (deregulation) was not possible, Viking only had two options: either 
selling the vessel (cessation of activities) or reflagging it in order to enter into a new collective 
agreement (relocation). In other words, in order to survive under mutual recognition, Viking had to 
‘relocate’ the Rosella under a low-regulation flag. 
Claiming a step back to national treatment: legal challenges to mutual recognition 
Given the upsetting nature of the competitive pressure generated by mutual recognition for every 
economic sector exposed to competition from low-regulation States, it should not come as a surprise 
that the principle of mutual recognition has been – and still is – the object of numerous legal 
challenges. Such legal challenges include the reverse discrimination defence, the dumping defence and 
the abuse defence. These legal challenges have two traits in common: they claim a step back from 
mutual recognition to national treatment, and they have been largely unsuccessful. 
The ‘reverse discrimination’ defence as (unsuccessful) challenge against mutual recognition 
The ‘reverse discrimination’ defence was one of the first legal challenges launched against the 
principle of mutual recognition. In essence, a reverse discrimination occurs whenever domestic 
products are subject to stricter regulatory standards than incoming products, thereby suffering a 
competitive disadvantage on their own domestic market.
59
 As explained above, such reverse 
discriminations are mechanically produced by mutual recognition in all situations where compliance 
with host law is costlier than compliance with home law, with the consequence that goods and services 
produced in the host State suffer from a structural competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis goods and 
services imported from a low-regulation State. 
This mechanical effect can be illustrated with the judgments in Leclerc and Cognet.
60
 In Leclerc, the 
Court ruled that a French legislation imposing a minimum retail price for books was contrary to free 
movement of goods and could not, as a consequence, be applied to imported books. Cognet concerned 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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the French legislative amendment implementing the Leclerc ruling, according to which the minimum 
price requirement did not apply, as a rule, to imported goods (para 5). The referring judge observed 
that, in such circumstances, ‘French distributors were exposed to the disadvantages of competition 
without their being enabled to meet that competition with equivalent means and French traders and 
foreign exporters to France were no longer treated equally’ (para 6). The Court was asked whether 
such a difference of treatment was contrary to the principles of equality and non-discrimination 
contained in the Treaty. The Court squarely ruled that ‘[Union] law does not apply to treatment which 
works to the detriment of national products as compared with imported products’ (para 11). 
As is well known, Cognet is but one of many instances in which the Court has consistently refused to 
sanction reverse discriminations.
61
 In the more recent Italian chocolate case, the Court bluntly stated 
that it is ‘irrelevant that the obligation established at Article 34 TFEU is capable of placing the 
national products of the host State at a disadvantage’.62 In sum, the reverse discrimination defence has 
failed to limit the expansion of the obligation of mutual recognition. 
The ‘dumping’ defence as (unsuccessful) challenge against mutual recognition 
The dumping defence represents a second – largely unsuccessful – challenge against the principle of 
mutual recognition. The dumping defence is more commonly used in the area of services, and chiefly 
in relation to the posting of workers.
63
 In essence, the dumping defence is a recasting of the reverse 
discrimination defence, whereby economic terminology (‘dumping’) replaces legal terminology 
(‘discrimination’). The underlying idea remains however identical: under a regime of mutual 
recognition, domestic services suffer from a structural competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis services 
provided from a low-regulation State. In relation to posted workers, a low-regulation State means a 
State where social protection is less comprehensive: 
In relation to services the issue [of how far the principle of mutual recognition of regimes is to be 
enforced] is none other than the fundamental but often frustrating question of what is ‘social dumping’. 
With regard to services involving the supply of labour, mutual recognition of regulatory regimes could 
mean that the labour law standards of the Member State of establishment will govern the employment 
terms of workers hired in the state of establishment by the provider of the services, even if the services 
are to be provided through those employees in another Member State (the ‘host’ Member State), which 
has higher regulatory standards.
64
 
The Court’s case law on posted workers has undergone a radical evolution, from endorsing national 
treatment in Rush Portuguesa to imposing mutual recognition in Laval. As the switch from home law 
to host law does not entail a specific cost for migrant workers,
65
 the choice between national treatment 
and mutual recognition in the context of labour and social security obligations amounts to a choice 
between a level-playing field for all workers (Rush Portuguesa: national treatment) and a competitive 
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advantage for posted workers – and their employers – coming from a low-regulation country (Laval: 
mutual recognition). 
Rush Portuguesa concerned a special contribution imposed by French authorities on a Portuguese 
company for bringing Portuguese workers from Portugal without permission, in order to carry out 
works for the construction of a railway line.66 The Court held that the host State could not preclude an 
undertaking established in another Member State from moving on its territory with his staff in order to 
provide services there (para 12). However, the Court allowed the host State to apply its ordinary 
labour laws to such posted workers (para 18): 
[Union] law does not preclude Member States from extending their legislation, or collective labour 
agreements entered into by both sides of industry, to any person who is employed, even temporarily, 
within their territory, no matter in which country the employer is established; nor does [Union] law 
prohibit Member States from enforcing those rules by appropriate means. 
In other words, the Court endorsed national treatment in Rush Portuguesa, thereby thwarting the risk 
of social dumping: as both domestic and posted workers were subject to host law (level-playing field), 
they were engaged in a process of merit-based competition, and so were their respective employers. 
Professor Barnard wrote: 
Thus, in one (unreasoned) paragraph, the Court put a stop to a threat of social dumping – without using 
this language – by allowing the host state to extend its labour laws and conditions to the staff employed 
by service providers working in its country.
67
 
However, the Rush Portuguesa ruling was delivered in 1990, and the impact of the subsequent Säger 
ruling (1991) was quickly felt in the field of posted workers. The restriction approach of Säger was 
transposed in Vander Elst,
68
 and Guiot marked the conceptual shift to mutual recognition.
69
 Indeed, 
Guiot reconstructed the principle of national treatment endorsed in Rush Portuguesa as a mere 
derogation justified by ‘overriding requirements of public interest’ in the sense of Säger, with the 
consequence that it could only apply when some ‘public interest’ was not safeguarded by the laws of 
the home State (paras 11–13). Therefore, the host State could only ‘extend its legislation’ in the sense 
of Rush Portuguesa where it was necessary to ensure the social protection of posted workers, which 
was not the case where they enjoyed a ‘comparable’ protection in the home State (paras 16–18). Guiot 
was confirmed in cases such as Arblade, Finalarte or Portugaia Construções.
70
 
Against this context was issued the seminal Laval ruling, which concerned the conditions of 
employment of Latvian workers posted on a construction site in Sweden.
71
 Swedish trade unions 
initiated a collective action to force their employer, Laval, to negotiate the rates of pay and sign the 
collective agreement for the building sector. The Court ruled that this collective action amounted to a 
restriction of the freedom to provide services (para 99). Moreover, if the protection of the workers of 
the host State against social dumping could constitute an overriding reason of public interest (para 
103), this collective action could not be justified since the Latvian employer was only required to 
observe the nucleus of mandatory rules for minimum protection in the host State defined in Article 
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3(1) of Directive 96/71 (para 108). The Court confirmed Laval in Rüffert, by ruling that a minimum 
wage could not be enforced in Germany against a Polish subcontractor if it had not been fixed 
according to one of the procedures laid down in Articles 3(1) and 3(8) of Directive 96/71 (para 35).
72
 
In short, mutual recognition had become the rule, and national treatment the exception whose 
boundaries are strictly defined by Articles 3(1) and 3(8) of Directive 96/71. 
To sum up, national treatment (Rush Portuguesa) formed a natural bulwark against social dumping, 
which was progressively dismantled by the expansion of mutual recognition (Guiot, Laval and 
Rüffert):
73
 indeed, mutual recognition allows employers to ‘import’ their home law when posting 
workers from their home State. Just as the reverse discrimination defence, the dumping defence has 
failed to limit the expansion of mutual recognition. 
The ‘abuse’ defence as (unsuccessful) challenge against mutual recognition 
Defences based on the prevention of reverse discriminations and dumping have proved unsuccessful in 
challenging the expansion of mutual recognition in the area of goods and services. As a result of this 
expansion, businesses in every State are facing the risk of suffering from a structural competitive 
disadvantage vis-à-vis businesses established in a low(er)-regulation State. As illustrated above with 
the Viking case, this peculiar competitive pressure generated by mutual recognition is likely to create 
an incentive for businesses in high-regulation States to relocate in low(er)-regulation States, in order to 
regain their capacity to compete.
74
 
The ‘abuse’ defence is specifically aimed at countering such strategies of relocation. It is raised by 
stakeholders established in the host State that have an interest in seeking the enforcement of host law, 
such as public authorities (in Centros or Cadbury Schweppes) or persons benefiting from the 
protection of host law (for instance, the seafarers in Viking). In essence, the argument put forward in 
this context is that businesses should not have the right to elect the national law of a low-regulation 
State, and then rely on mutual recognition to provide goods and services throughout the internal 
market. The concrete claim put forward in this context is, again, to substitute mutual recognition with 
national treatment – in other words, to allow the host State to apply its ordinary laws to businesses 
relocated in a low-regulation State. 
In the field of ship regulation, such relocation is achieved by reflagging a ship in a low-regulation 
State, as illustrated by the Viking case. In this context, the fight against abusive practices takes on the 
appellation of fight against ‘flags of convenience’, namely the practice of registering a ship in a (low-
regulation) State of which the owner is not a national.
75
 In its judgment, the Court held that the fight 
against flags of convenience was not a legitimate objective capable of justifying restrictions on 
freedom of establishment (para 88). In so far as it was intended to protect the conditions of 
employment of seafarers, the fight against flags of convenience could not be justified either, because it 
also covered situations in which the ship was registered in a State offering a higher level of social 
protection (para 89). 
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The seminal Centros ruling, already evoked above, provides another illustration of the phenomenon 
targeted by the abuse defence.
76
 The shareholders of Centros were Danish residents who wished to 
carry out a wine trading business in Denmark. To that end, they formed a company in the United 
Kingdom, where no minimum capital requirement was imposed, with the avowed purpose of avoiding 
the Danish rules on minimum paid-up capital (para 18). The Danish public authorities refused to 
register a branch of Centros in Denmark on the ground that Centros sought to circumvent Danish law. 
They also argued that the minimum capital requirement was intended to protect a specific group of 
stakeholders, namely creditors. The Court famously ruled that forming a company in the State whose 
rules of company law seem the least restrictive, and thereafter setting up branches in other States, does 
not amount to abuse (para 27). In effect, the Centros ruling dismissed the abuse defence and imposed 
mutual recognition in the field of company law, at least in entry cases.
77
 
In tax matters, the abuse defence is best known as fight against tax avoidance. Tax avoidance 
strategies set up in a cross-border context seek to shift profits from a high-tax jurisdiction to a low-tax 
jurisdiction. One recurrent issue is the extent to which multinational corporate groups may use related 
companies as conduits to shift profits across States and minimize their global tax bill. This issue is 
aptly illustrated by the Cadbury Schweppes case.
78
 The parent company of the Cadbury Schweppes 
group was a public limited company incorporated in the UK, as such subject to income tax in the UK. 
The group incorporated two subsidiaries in the International Financial Services Centre (‘IFSC’) in 
Dublin, which were entrusted with intra-group finance activities. This double incorporation was meant 
to subject the profits yielded by intra-group finance to the convenient 10% tax rate applicable in the 
IFSC (para 18). Indeed, profits made by a related company established in another State are taxed as a 
rule in the latter State, namely Ireland (para 4), which amounts de facto to a situation of mutual 
recognition. 
The UK raised an abuse defence in the form of ‘CFC rules’, namely tax rules applicable to ‘controlled 
foreign companies’. The CFC rules provided that, if a UK company owns more than 50% in a foreign 
company (which is then ‘controlled’), and the foreign company pays little or no taxes abroad,79 then 
the parent company is taxed in the UK on the profits made by its foreign subsidiary, after deduction of 
the taxes paid abroad. This, once again, is a claim to national treatment: the UK wanted to apply UK 
taxes on profits made by the Irish subsidiaries, and not be forced to recognize the tax jurisdiction of 
Ireland. 
The Court judged that, although they restricted the freedom of establishment, such CFC rules could be 
justified on the basis of the prevention of abuses, but only in so far as they targeted ‘wholly artificial 
arrangements which do not reflect economic reality with a view to escaping the tax normally due on 
the profits generated by activities carried out on national territory’ (para 55). The Court further 
qualified the notion of wholly artificial arrangements as ‘fictitious establishments not carrying out any 
genuine economic activity’ (paras 66–68). Since Cadbury Schweppes, the Court has consistently 
limited the scope of the abuse defence in tax matters to such wholly artificial arrangements.
80
 As a 
consequence, the abuse defence can be defeated by any genuine economic activity carried out by a 
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related company in a low-tax jurisdiction – such as intra-group finance in the Cadbury Schweppes 
case. As a matter of fact, Irish lawyers hailed the Cadbury Schweppes ruling as a ‘tonic for Irish 
business’,81 while the Guardian described it as a ‘court blow’ suffered by the Treasury in offshore tax 
fight
.82
 
Overall, the Court’s case law has severely curtailed the room for the abuse defence in the context of 
free movement, thereby enabling businesses to relocate in a low-regulation State and subsequently rely 
on mutual recognition to offer their goods and services throughout the internal market. The abuse 
defence has failed to impede the expansion of mutual recognition. 
Conclusion: from freedom of movement to obligation of movement 
Member States can logically adopt three policies when regulating cross-border activities: they can 
treat cross-border activities worse (discrimination), equally (national treatment) or better (mutual 
recognition) than domestic activities. As a rule, discrimination is incompatible with the freedoms of 
movement, and Member States are alternatively requested to adopt national treatment (chiefly in 
relation to incoming workers, with the notable exception of posted workers) or mutual recognition 
(chiefly in the areas of goods, services and companies). 
National treatment and mutual recognition have radically different impacts on the type of market 
discipline imposed on producers throughout the Union. National treatment tends to subject domestic 
and incoming workers to the same regulatory standard, which is defined by the host State (level-
playing field). As a result, domestic and incoming workers are engaged in a process of merit-based 
competition, in which superior merits tend to translate into higher market shares. To that extent, 
national treatment generates extra competitive pressures on domestic workers, who can be displaced 
by incoming workers showing superior merits. However, these extra competitive pressures are likely 
to be limited and not be felt as ‘unfair’, since they arise on a level-playing field. 
By contrast, mutual recognition subjects domestic and foreign producers to different regulatory 
standards: domestic goods, services and companies must abide by the law of the host State, whereas 
incoming goods, services and companies remain subject to the law of their home State. As a result, 
competition between domestic and imported producers is based not only on merit, but also on the cost 
of compliance with national laws. Producers established in a low(er)-regulation home State enjoy a 
structural competitive advantage – originating in regulation – over domestic producers established in 
the host State, irrespective of their eventual superior merits. Consequently, the competitive pressures 
added by mutual recognition may be substantial and felt as ‘unfair’; arguably, the so-called ‘Polish 
plumber’ is a mutual-recognition plumber, not a national-treatment plumber. 
Furthermore, the extra competitive pressures generated by mutual recognition are likely to create an 
incentive for domestic producers to relocate in low(er)-regulation States, in order to regain their 
capacity to compete (Viking). In other words, mutual recognition may actually impose an obligation of 
movement on domestic producers suffering from a structural competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis 
producers established in low(er)-regulation States. Given the upsetting nature of these competitive 
pressures, it should not come as a surprise that mutual recognition has been – and still is – the object 
of numerous legal challenges. Nevertheless, defences based on the fight against reverse 
discriminations, dumping or abusive practices have by and large failed to impede the expansion of the 
obligation of mutual recognition. 
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The impact of the freedoms of movement can now be reassessed from the perspective of market 
discipline. Put in a slightly provocative way, the freedoms of movement are not intended to increase 
human freedom, but rather to constrain it through an ever-expanding market discipline. On a 
horizontal plane, the constant broadening of the scope of the freedoms of movement has subjected a 
constantly increasing volume of human activities to market discipline exerted by producers established 
in other States. On a vertical plane, the switch from national treatment to mutual recognition exposes 
human activities to a harsher type of market discipline, under which superior merits are not rewarded. 
Overall, the expansion of free movement subjects more human activities to more market discipline. 
  
 
